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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent (hereafter "Painter") respectfully 
submits that Plaintiff-Appellant (hereafter "Smurthwaite") 
has, pursuant to his brief, limited this appeal to one issue. 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court's 
ruling that the parties did not enter into an "agistment 
bailment agreement" is supported by the evidence presented 
at trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court has set forth a concise statement of 
findings of fact, which Painter hereby adopts as being sup-
ported by the evidence in this case. 
Painter also adopts as substantially correct the statement 
of facts set forth in Appellant's Brief, with the following 
additions and modifications: 
1. Painter adopts as the primary statement of fact 
governing this case, the following statement set forth in 
Appellant's own brief on Page 8 under Point I of his Argument: 
For purposes of this Appeal, Mr. Smurthwaite accepts, 
as being based on substantial evidence, the District 
Court's Finding of Fact (record at 129 and 132) that 
Mr. Painter did not expressly agree to provide anything 
to Mr. Smurthwaite other than a place for Mr. Smurthwaite 
to pasture his horses. 
2. Smurthwaite did not expect Painter to do any feeding 
or taking care of the horses as shown by the following re-
sponses from Smurthwaite on direct examination concerning 
his interpretation of the parties' agreement: 
1 
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( 
Q. Did you [Smurthwaite] make any representations 
about looking after the horses or taking care of them < 
in any way? 
A. No. There was no mention and I didn't expect 
him [Painter] to do any feeding whatsoever... Transcript 
Vol. II, P. 29, L. 23-25. 
3. Painter told Smurthwaite that he did not have time 
to look after or be concerned with Smurthwaitefs horses. 
Transcript Vol. II, P. 226-228. 
4. At all times Smurthwaite had complete access to 
and and control over his own horses in connection with bringing 
in additional horses or taking horses away from the subject 
pasturage. Smurthwaite regularly moved horses in and out 
in connection with his breeding business, with no need of 
Painter's consent or knowledge. At the end of each month 
until November, 1983, Smurthwaite would count the number 
of horses on the pasturage in order to determine the amount 
of the rent owed to Painter at $15.00 per head per month. 
Transcript Vol. II, P. 33; also P. 85 & 88. 
5. From the beginning of the parties1 pasture rental 
agreement Smurthwaite had regularly inspected, fed and looked 
after his own horses; At least two to three times a week 
from the fall of 1981 up until his last visit in December 
of 1983. Transcript Vol. II, P. 37, 40, 44, 49. 
6. At all times relevant hereto Painter had a full 
time job as an electrical contractor, which kept him away 
from home from early morning until dusk during work days; 
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Smurthwaite was fully aware of this. Transcript Vol. II, 
P. 215-216; also P. 87. 
7. Painter disputes Paragraph 3 of Smurthwaite's State-
ment of facts to the extent that it implies Smurthwaite was 
not aware in the winter of 1983 that Smurthwaite's horses 
were on the "lower pasture11. Smurthwaite visited his horses 
in December of 1983, finding them on the lower pasture, which 
Smurthwaite claims to be less desirable as compared to the 
upper pasture. Smurthwaite did not take any action to move 
his horses onto the upper pasture at that time, or to request 
Painter to do so. Smurthwaite made no comment to Painter 
about the situation, and left, not to return until February 
8, 1984 after his horses had starved to death. Transcript 
Vol. II, P. 52, 78-79, 93-95. 
8. At all times relevant hereto there were three methods 
of access to the lower pasture containing Smurthwaitefs horses. 
One road past Painter's house and farmyard, and the others 
to the south, not visible from Painter's house or yard, the 
most accessible being through property owned by the "Sewer 
Company". The Sewer Company's road was kept plowed in the 
winter. Transcript Vol. II, P. 220. 
9. Smurthwaite testified that Painter had said that 
since Painter lived close to the pasturage Painter would 
call Smurthwaite if Painter or his family happened to see 
something about the horses that required attention; But accord-
ing to Smurthwaite's own testimony there was no obligation 
3 
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or requirement under the parties1 agreement, that Painter 
actually go out into the fields and inspect Smurthwaitefs 
horses, or attend to them in any way. Tr. Vol. I, P. 76. 
10. Smurthwaite was an experienced horseman and horse 
breeder, and Smurthwaite knew that Painter was not. Transcript 
Vol. I, P. 74. 
11. Smurthwaite knew that horses need extra care and 
feed through the winter months and could starve to death 
in two to four weeks with no feed. Transcript Vol. II, P. 
71-72 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant has limited the question on this appeal to 
one issue: Did an agistment bailment exist between the par-
ties, contrary to the ruling of the trial court? If there 
was no such bailment agreement between the parties then 
Smurthwaite's appeal must fail, because absent a contractual 
duty to care for Smurthwaitefs property, Painter had no other 
legal duty to do so. 
It is Painterfs position, as well as the court's, that 
the agreement was for pasturage rental only, with no duty 
on the part of Painter to care for, look after, or feed the 
horses. Furthermore, Smurthwaite agrees in his own brief 
herein, that the agreement between the parties was one for 
pasturage rental only. Under the express terms of the agree-
ment, and as supported by the law cited hereinbelow, Painter 
had no obligation to Smurthwaite other than to provide the 
4 
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use of the pasture. Therefore, Painter cannot be liable 
for the death of the horses resulting from Smurthwaitefs 
neglect through the winter of 1983-1984. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE WAS NO BAILMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES BECAUSE PAINTER DID NOT AGREE 
TO CARE FOR SMURTHWAITEfS HORSES AND 
ACCOUNT FOR THEM AFTER A SPECIFIED TERM 
An "Agistment Bailment'1 is no more or less than a bailment 
agreement involving livestock. A bailment agreement is an 
agreement whereby property is entrusted or delivered to one 
party by another in trust for a specified purpose, with the 
express or implied agreement that the property will be returned 
or accounted for when the purpose is accomplished. 
The most recent Utah case on agistment bailment is Baker 
v. Hansen, 666 P 2d 315 (Utah, 1983). The plaintiff rancher 
sued the defendant cattle owner under an "agistment lien", 
and the Court found an agistment bailment under the following 
circumstances: The defendant cattle owner entered into an 
agreement with the plaintiff rancher whereby the plaintiff 
"...would pasture and care for [defendant's] cows for a period 
of one year in exchange for 60 percent of the calf crop de-
livered by the impregnated cows during that year, and reimburse-
ment for the care and feeding of the remaining livestock". 666 
P 2d at 316. In finding an agistment bailment, and in deter-
mining the amount of the plaintiff's agistor's lien, the 
court took into consideration the plaintiff's charges for 
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the value of the pasture, the amount of hay fed to the animals, 
the costs to plaintiff for hay, and the value of the labor 
performed in caring for the herd. The court also found plain-
tiff was responsible for failure to return or account for 
some of the cattle. The court stated that "... a contract 
to care for animals for a specified term ... and an obligation 
to return or account for the animals at the end of the term...11 
is an agistment bailment. 666 P 2d at 320. 
Painter and Smurthwait clearly did not have such an 
agreement here. They had simply a pasture rental agreement. 
The courts have distinguished a mere pasture rental agreement 
from an agistment bailment agreement as regards the duty 
owed by the land owner to the livestock owner. In the case 
of Cox vs. Pithoud, 34 Cal. Rptr, 582 (1963), the defendant 
agreed to place 10 of plaintiff!s calves on defendant's irri-
gated pasture and to keep, water and maintain the calves. 
Defendant neglected the calves, which were in poor condition 
when plaintiff reclaimed them. Plaintiff initiated an action 
against defendant for the negligent injury of the calves. 
The court found that under the conditions of the contract, 
the defendant M... was not merely leasing pasture to plaintiff 
but actually was contracting as a agister or depositary of 
animals for hire11. 34 Cal. Rptr. at 583. [Emphasis added]. 
The court found that as an agister the defendant had a duty 
to provide the livestock with suitable food and to exercise 
reasonable care for the safety of the animals. 
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Other courts which have considered the issue and found 
the same requirements for the creation of an agistment bailment 
agreement are as follows: 
Erbacher vs. Wargel, 465 N.E. 2d 195 (Indiana 1984), 
where the bailor boarded a horse with the bailee for $65.00 
per month, which included feed and care; David vs. Lose, 
218 N.E. 2d 443 (Ohio, 1966), where the bailor delivered 
a Tennessee Walking Horse mare into the custody and control 
of bailee for breeding purposes, paying a stud fee therefore; 
White v. Sullivan, 219 N.W. 908 (Minnesota 1928), where the 
bailor, under an agreement with the bailee, delivered a horse 
into the sole custody and control of bailee to v/ork on bailee's 
farm. 
An agistment bailment, as clearly set forth pursuant 
to the above stated law, is an agreement whereby the bailee 
takes custody and control of bailor's animals and cares for 
them for a specified term. The agreement between the parties 
to this case is just as clearly distinguishable. Smurthwaite 
had complete access and control over his horses; had the 
obligation to feed and care for them himself; could bring 
in and take out horses at will; and, as Smurthwaite expressly 
states, Painter did not agree to provide anything other than 
a place for Smurthwaite to pasture his horses. 
The appellant would have this court believe that contrary 
to the express agreement between the parties in this case, 
the law does, or should, still place a duty on Painter to 
7 
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look after and care for Smurthwaitefs horses as though Painter 
were the "reasonable owner11. Appellant cites several cases 
which he says supports this proposition. A reading of those 
cases, however, shows that they are either totally inapplicable 
factually and legally, or they are in fact cases where an 
express bailment contract was formed between the parties, 
and thus clearly distinguishable from this case. Those cases 
are as follows: 
1. Bramlette v. Titus, 267 P 2d 620 (Nevada, 1954). 
In this case plaintiffs and defendants entered into an agree-
ment whereby plaintiffs would deliver cattle to defendants1 
ranch where they would graze with defendants1 cattle and 
be cared for by defendants. Defendants would feed plaintiffs1 
cattle additional feed if necessary, using defendants1 own 
judgment, and charge plaintiffs for the additional feed; 
2. Marcus v. Eastern Agr. Ass'n Inc., 157 A 2d 3 (N.J., 
1959). This is a New Jersey Workman's Compensation case; 
3. Frazier v. Kern, 566 P 2d 956 (Wash., 1977). This 
case does not involve injury to animals under a pasturage 
or bailment agreement. Here the plaintiffs were attemmpting 
to enjoin forfeiture of a lease of grazing land from defen-
dant. The court found that plaintiffs1 agreement with a 
third party was not a "sublease11 nor an "assignment11, but 
an "agistment". There was no discussion of bailment issues; 
4. Baker v. Hansen is discussed above. This was clearly 
an express bailment agreement whereby the land owner would 
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take the livestock owner's cattle into his custody and care 
for and feed them for one year; 
5. Hughes v, Yardley, 428 P 2d 158 (Utah, 1967). The 
defendants agreed to take cattle owned by plaintiffs onto 
defendants1 ranch and pasture them from May 1, 1964 to October 
1, 1964. The plaintiffs were to pay one-half of the market 
value of the gain of the cattle during that period; 
6. Ward v. Newell, 315 S.E. 2d 721 (N.C., 1984). The 
plaintiff bought a mare from the defendant after which the 
parties entered into an agreement whereby the ,f... mare would 
be left in the defendant's care and custody for a period 
of 30 days". This was later extended for an additional period 
of time and the plaintiff paid a boarding fee. 
7. Vaughn v. Bixby, 142 P 100 (Cal., 1914). The plain-
tiffs placed four horses into the "charge and control11 of 
defendants. The plaintiffs did not inspect the pasture upon 
defendants1 promise that they would "look after them, and 
put them where (there) is feed and water". 
In none of the cases cited by Appellant is there really 
an issue as to the existence of a bailment. The existence 
of a bailment was clear because in each of the cited cases 
there was a taking into custody by the bailee and caring 
for the animals, usually for a specified term. In each of 
the cited cases the parties expressly agreed to terms which 
constituted a bailment and the bailee was aware of his duty 
to care for the animals. 
9 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial court's 
ruling that the parties did not enter into an agistment bail-
ment agreement was proper and was based upon the evidence 
in this case. The court correctly ruled that such an agreement 
"...requires in all cases that the person sought to be charged 
has some contractual responsibility for the care of the live-
stock". The absence of such an agreement was clearly supported 
by the facts, and respondent respectfully requests that the 
Judgment of the trial court be sustained. 
DATED this /Y day of November, 1986. 
TAYLOR pr.j CARR 
Attorney/for Defendant-
Respondent 
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